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Federal Sentencing Guidelines
by Andrea Wilson*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Whether the sentencing guidelines have finally become familiar

enough for consistent application or because there were so few amendments last year,' there seem to be fewer dramatic and controversial
Eleventh Circuit decisions regarding sentencing this year than in years
past. The court took the opportunity to focus more closely on the process
of sentencing itself rather than on the precise application of the
guidelines.
The Court wrote extensively about the district courts' frequent failure
to create a fully articulated record on which appellate review can be had.
Expanding on its earlier requirement that district courts elicit and
respond to objections to sentencing issues by the parties set forth in
United States v. Jones,2 the Eleventh Circuit criticized district courts for
failing to follow Jones' simple conditions.? In a similar vein, the
Eleventh Circuit remanded a number of drug crime sentences because
the district courts had not sufficiently supported their determinations of
the appropriate quantities of drugs involved with facts on the record.4
* Assistant Federal Public Defender, Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division.
Former Assistant Public Defender, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Tampa, Florida. Defender
Services liaison to the United States Sentencing Commission (1991). Faculty Member,
Orientation Seminar for Assistant Federal Defenders, National Defense Investigators
Association (sentencing guideline training for court appointed panels in various districts).
Florida State University (B.S., 1978; J.D., 1981). Member, The Florida Bar; United States
District Court for the Middle District of Florida; Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
1. There were only six: amendments 503-509. Effective November 1, 1994.
2. See United States v. Jones, 899 F.2d 1097, 1097 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 906 (1990), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Morrill, 984 F.2d 1136 (11th
Cir. 1993).
3. See United States v. Page, 69 F.3d 482, 492 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Shields, 49 F.3d 707, 709, vacated, 65 F.3d 900 (11th Cir. 1995).
4. See United States v. Lawrence, 47 F.3d 1559, 1566 (11th Cir. 1995); United States
v. Lee, 68 F.3d 1267, 1274 (11th Cir. 1995).
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The burden these failed sentences create on the court is obvious; they
have been remanded for new sentencing hearings and will undoubtedly
be appealed again, only to take up more of the court's time and energy
the second time around.
Naturally, the sentencing guidelines cannot be completely divorced
from other more general sentencing issues, and the court addressed a
number of those as well. These areas include the application of
statutory minimum mandatory sentences based on drug quantities and
on prior convictions.'
II.

SIGNIFICANT NON-GUIDELINES ISSUES

A.

Restitution
In United States v. Page,6 the district court ordered restitution jointly
and severally among the defendants, but also stated that the restitution
paid by one could not be applied to the restitution owed by another.7
The Eleventh Circuit discourages joint and several restitution obligations
because of the natural differences in each defendant's ability to pay.8
The court, however, found that sentencing courts could not require joint
and several responsibility and, at the same time, preclude payment by
one to be credited to others because the "concepts are mutually
exclusive.'
In United States v. Schrimsher, ° the court held that a defendant can
agree to restitution greater than the loss relating to the offense of
conviction." The defendant was arrested in possession of three stolen
cars, and he later pled guilty to one count of possession of a stolen motor
vehicle."2 At sentencing, Schrimsher's attorney told the district court
that even though "the plea agreement does not set out specifically that
[Schrimsher] will agree to restitution [for the] three automobiles... we
represented by stipulation [that Schrimsher] knew the cars were stolen
... and he had the three cars so he is responsible for them.""

The

court held that the defendant waived any objection and agreed to pay

5.
Cobia,
6.
7.
8.
9.

See United States v. Brown, 47 F.3d 1075, 1077 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v.
41 F.3d 1473, 1476 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1986 (1995).
69 F.3d 482 (11th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 494.
Id.
Id.

10. 58 F.3d 608 (11th Cir. 1995).
11. Id. at 610.
12. Id. at 609.

13. Id. (brackets in original).

19961

FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES

.853

restitution for the three vehicles.,4 Earlier, the court had remanded
the case for reconsideration of the restitution order in light of the fact
that the plea agreement did not contain a specific agreement for
restitution greater than the single count of conviction."
B. Mandatory Minimum Sentences
Title 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), in conjunction with 21 U.S.C. § 851,
requires a mandatory life sentence for a defendant convicted of a drug
trafficking crime if the defendant has previously been convicted of more
than two felony drug offenses and if the government has filed an
information invoking the enhancement. Title 18 U.S.C. § 851(a)(2)
provides that, "[an information may not be filed under this section...
unless the person either waived or was afforded prosecution by
indictment for the offense for which such increased punishment may be
imposed."
In United States v. Brown,'" the defendant claimed that his sentence
was improper because the prior convictions being used as the basis for
the enhancement were charged by information, and he had not waived
indictment.17 The Eleventh Circuit, deciding the question for the first
time, agreed with other circuits and held that the case in which the
enhanced penalty is being sought is the one that must be brought by
indictment or by information with a waiver, not the prior convictions.' 8
The enhanced sentence provision of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), however, does
not require that the defendant be put on notice the way other enhancement statutes do.'9 According to United States v. Cobia,20 the enhancement is invoked automatically when the defendant enters a plea
negotiation in which the government has specifically agreed not to seek
enhanced penalties (although the government maintained that the
enhancement might not be discretionary). 2' The court, studying the
legislative history of the provision, determined that Congress meant for

14. Id. at 610.
15. See United States v. Schrimsher, 58 F.3d 608, 610 (11th Cir. 1995).
16. 47 F.3d 1075 (11th Cir. 1995).
17. Id. at 1077.
18. Id. at 1077-78 (citing United States v. Espinosa, 827 F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 968 (1988); United States v. Adams, 914 F.2d 1404 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1015 (1990); United States v. Burrell, 963 F.2d 976 (7th Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom. Henry v. United States, 506 U.S. 928 (1992); United States v. Trevino-Rodriguez,
994 F.2d 533 (8th Cir. 1993)).
19. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841; 21 U.S.C. § 851.
20. 41 F.3d 1473 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1986 (1995).
21. 41 F.3d at 1475.
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the enhancement to be mandatory and automatic and, therefore, refused
to set aside the enhancement.2 2
III. 1995 AMENDMENTS
More than twenty-five new amendments went into effect November 1,
1995.2' The Commission added only two amendments to the list of
those which can be applied retroactively.24 Amendment 505, passed in
1994, eliminates the first two sections of the drug table, limiting the
offense level for drug cases to a maximum of 38.25 Amendment 516,
which reduces the equivalent weight of marijuana plants, can be applied
to defendants who have already been sentenced using
procedures set out
26

in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 and 19 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).
A.

Section 2A2.3 (MinorAssault)
Amendment 510 adds a four offense-level increase if "substantial
bodily injury" was inflicted on a victim under sixteen and defines the
term.' This amendment corresponds to recent legislation regarding
assaults against minors.'
B.

Sections 2A3.1, 2A3.2, 2A3.3, and 2A3.4 (Sex Abuse)
Amendment 511 authorizes a departure if the victim was raped by
more than one person or when the defendant has similar prior convictions.
C.

Section 2B1.1(b) (Theft, Possession of Stolen Property,etc.)
Amendment 512 adds a cross-reference based on the role of weapons
or drugs in the offense if calculation under other guidelines would result
in a higher computation.
D. Section 2B5.1(b) (Counterfeit)
Amendment 513 adds a two offense-level increase if a dangerous
weapon was possessed in connection with the offense.

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 1475.76.
U.S.S.G. App. C, amend. 510-536 and others.
See U.S.S.G. § IB1.10; U.S.S.G. amend. 536 (Nov. 1, 1995).
U.S.S.G. amend. 505 (Nov. 1, 1994).
U.S.S.G. amend. 516 (Nov. 1, 1995).
U.S.S.G. § 2A2.3.
18 U.S.C. § 113(b)(1) (1994).
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E.

Section 2Dl.l(b) (Drugs)
Amendment 514 adds a two offense-level enhancement for distribution
of drugs in jail. It also adds a cross-reference if the offense is simple
possession in jail.

F

Section 2D1.1(b) (Drugs)
Amendment 515 provides a two offense-level reduction for defendants
who meet the "safety valve" criteria of U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2 and 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(f) if the base offense level calculation is 26 or higher. The
decrease applies to the offense-level before any reductions for acceptance
of responsibility, role in the offense, substantial assistance, etc.
G. Section 2D1. 1(c) (Drugs)
Amendment 516 changes the equivalency of marijuana plants to 100
grams regardless of the number or the sex of the plants.2" This
amendment is retroactive.
H. Section 2D1.1(c)(10) (Drug Table)
Amendment 517 changes the equivalency calculation for a number of
drugs which are normally delivered in pill form to account for different
methods of manufacture. The modification more fairly represents the
actual amounts of controlled substances involved by counting the
number of pills instead of the weight of the pills.
I. Section 2D1.1(c) (DrugTable)
Amendment 518 is an eight-part amendment changing numerous
aspects of the drug table. First, the amendment supplies a definition of
hashish and hashish oil to eliminate circuit splits.'s It next addresses
the treatment of marijuana whose dampness makes it unusable without
drying.3 1 Courts are instructed to approximate the weight in a usably
dry form. The amendment also addresses the often-asked question,
"when is a plant a plant?" The answer is, when it has "leaves and a
readily observable root formation"

2

The amendment adds two drug

29. Until now, if the case involved more than fifty marijuana plants, each was given
a presumptive weight of one kilogram.
30. See United States v. Gravelle, 819 F. Supp. 1076 (S.D. Fla. 1993); United States v.
Schultz, 810 F. Supp. 230 (S.D. Ohio 1992).
31. See United States v. Smith, 51 F.3d 980 (11th Cir. 1995).
32. United States v. Foree, 43 F.3d 1572, 1580 n.12 (11th Cir. 1995); Shields, 49 F.3d
at 710 n.8.
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equivalencies to the table, for khat and levo-alpha-acetylmethadol
(LAAM) and deletes LSD as a listed precursor chemical. It eliminates
the distinction between D- and L-Methamphetamine, saying that LMethamphetamine is, really only a mistake and should be treated just
like D-Methamphetamine since that is what defendants intend to
make." Finally, the amendment addresses cases involving negotiated
drug quantities by applying the negotiated amount unless the sale has
been completed and the actual amount delivered is a more accurate
reflection of the scope of the offense. The district courts are instructed
not to include amounts that were negotiated but which the defendant
"was not reasonably capable of providing."
J.

Section 2D1.11(d) (Listed PrecursorChemicals)
Amendment 519 renames parts of the list and deletes references to
LSD. It adds two other chemicals, Benzaldehyde and Nitroethane, and
addresses the difference between ephedrine (purchased from chemical
companies in a very pure form) and pills containing ephedrine (usually
at very low dosages).
K.

Section 2D1.12(a) (Lab Equipment Offenses)
Amendment 520 addresses those defendants who "had reasonable
cause to believe" that the equipment was to be used to manufacture
controlled substances, but not actual knowledge, by giving them a three
offense-level reduction.

L. Section 2H1 (Offenses Involving Individual Rights), § 3A1.1
(Vulnerable Victim)
Amendment 521 deletes most of subpart H of Chapter Two. The
offenses formerly covered by several different guidelines are now scored
under the new section 2H1.1. A new offense for obstructing access to
clinic entrances is now scored in this subpart.' Offenses against the
elderly are also addressed in the new section 2H1.1.
U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1 is completely rewritten and now includes a three
offense-level enhancement for hate crimes. The Commission explains
that much of the rewriting is to ensure that the provisions of section 2H
and section 3A1.1 are not applied cumulatively.

33. See United States v. Ramsdale, 61 F.3d 825 (11th Cir. 1995).
34. 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1994).
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M. Section 2K2.1(a)(1) (Firearms)
Amendment 522 extensively rewrites the guideline and now provides
the same increased offense level for semiautomatic firearms as for
machine guns. It also addresses the misdemeanor of sale or transfer of
a firearm to a minor. 5 The felony of sale or transfer of a firearm to a
minor having reasonable cause to believe that it was intended for use in
a crime now has a minimum offense level of eighteen.3" The definition
of "prohibited person" is broadened and certain Brady Act violations
which are misdemeanors have a base offense level of six."
N. Section 2L1.2 (Unlawful Entry)
Amendment 523 authorizes a departure for defendants who have
repeatedly reentered the country without having been convicted.
0. Section 2L2.1 (Trafficking in Immigration Documents)
Amendment 524 adds a four offense-level increase if the defendant had
reason to believe that the documents would be used to facilitate a felony
(other than an immigration violation), and authorizes a departure if the
felony was "an especially serious type." It also provides a cross-reference
to other guideline sections.
P. Section 2P1.2 (Contrabandin Prisons)38
Amendment 525 adds Methamphetamine to the list of prohibited
substances and reflects the increased punishment for these crimes
generally.
Q. Section 3A (Adjustments)
Amendment 526 adds subsection 3A1.4, International Terrorism,
which provides a twelve-level enhancement to the offense level, with a
minimum level of thirty-two and an automatic criminal history category
increase to VI.
Section 3B1:4 (Using a Minor to Commit a Crime)
This section, which is completely rewritten by Amendment 527, adds
a two-level increase to the offense level.

R.

35. Id. § 922(x)(1).
36. Id. § 922(x)(1).
37. Id. § 922(s).
38. See also U.S.S.G. amend. 514 (Nov. 1, 1995).
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Sections 4B1.1 and 4B1.2 (CareerOffender)
The background commentary to this section is rewritten by Amendment 528 in response to a recent District of Columbia case and now
specifically includes conspiracy offenses.8 9
S.

Sections 5D1.1 and 5D1.2 (SupervisedRelease)
Amendment 529 makes the imposition of supervised release following
incarceration more discretionary.
T

U. Section 5E1.1(a)(2) (Restitution)
Amendment 530 enacts certain "mandatory restitution" provisions of
18 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2258 (sex offenses), 18 U.S.C. § 2264 (domestic
violence) and 18 U.S.C. § 2327 (telemarketing fraud).
Section 5K2.17 (High-Capacity,Semiautomatic Firearms)
Amendment 531 authorizes a departure when a semiautomatic firearm
with a capacity of more than ten cartridges is used in a drug or violent
offense. The Commission believes that semiautomatics now form the
"heartland" of gun offenses because they are the weapon of choice in fifty
to seventy percent of offenses. Congress apparently disagrees and has
required increased punishment. The Commission tried to find a way to
add an enhancement to only the worst offenders by applying it to highcapacity weapons and not the most common semiautomatics.
V

W. Section 5K1.18 (Violent Street Gangs)
subject to
Amendment 532 authorizes a departure for a defendant
4
statutory enhancement for participation in a gang. '

Section 7B1.3(g)(2) (Revocation of Supervised Release)
Congress amended 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) by specifying that the
maximum term of incarceration after a violation of supervised release on
a Class A felony is five years. Title 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g) was also
amended to delete the mandatory one-third imprisonment for drug
violations. Amendment 533 enacts those changes. It still requires
imprisonment for a violation based on drug possession, but leaves the
length of the sentence to the court. It also requires revocation and
X.

39. United States v. Price, 990 F.2d 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see also United States v.
Weir, 51 F.3d 1031 (11th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 928 (1996).

40. See also U.S.S.G. amend. 522 (Nov. 1, 1995).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 521 (1994).
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incarceration if the defendant is in possession of a firearm or refuses to
submit to drug testing. The amendment instructs that additional,
though limited, supervised release can be imposed after incarceration on
a previous violation of release.
Section 5G1.3 (DefendantsServing UndischargedSentences)
This section, which never worked well, is extensively rewritten by
Amendment 535. It appears to provide district courts much greater
discretion in determining when sentences can be imposed to run
consecutively to, or concurrently with, previously-imposed sentences.
Y

IV.

1995 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT SENTENCING GUIDELINE CASES

A.

Generally
The court relied on a proposed guideline amendment to fashion a rule
of law in United States v. Smith." Reversing an earlier holding that
the entire weight of damp marijuana should be used to calculate the
base offense-level, the court cited United States v. Cruz4" for the
principle that proposed amendments can be used "as subsequent
legislative history to interpret the meaning of prior Application
Notes."' The proposed amendment relied upon in Smith has since
been enacted by Congress.45
A recurring problem in federal sentencing is the correct preservation
of objections to the sentencing procedure and to the sentence itself. The
46
court set out certain requirements years ago in United States v. Jones.
Jones requires that the sentencing court provide the parties ample
opportunity to state their objections and the grounds for the objections
on the record."7 If the district court complies but a party does not
clearly state its grounds, the objections are waived. 4' The standard of
review on appeal is greatly reduced since a waived objection will only be
reviewed for plain error.49

42. 51 F.3d 980 (11th Cir. 1995).
43. 805 F.2d 1464, 1471 n.8 (11th Cir. 1986).

44. 51F.3d at 981.
45. See U.S.S.G. amend 518 (Nov. 1, 1995).
46. 899 F.2d 1097 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 906 (1990), overruledon other
grounds, United States v. Morrill, 984 F.2d 1136 (11th Cir. 1993).
47. 899 F.2d at 1102.
48. Id.
49. United States v. Neely, 979 F.2d 1522 (11th Cir. 1992).
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In United States v. Maurice, ° the district court asked for objections
after imposing sentence. Counsel for the defendant answered, "[W]e
would reserve an objection as to the departure [based on prior convictions too old to count]."51 This explanation was not sufficiently clear to
preserve the objection for appeal under Jones.52
In United States v. Page,3 the district court ordered restitution
without making the required findings regarding the defendant's ability
to pay." Most of the defendants in the appeal did not raise the issue,
but because it was common to all, the court addressed the question. 5
In so doing, the court found that the requirements of Jones had not been
met and remanded the case for further findings.
The district court, after imposing sentence, simply advised the
defendant of her right to appeal without first asking for objections to the
sentence or order imposing restitution." This obligation remained,
despite a provision in the defendant's plea agreement that she "acknowledge[dI that the [clourt may order restitution as part of the sentence
imposed in the instant case."57
Similarly, the district court cannot simply adopt the factual findings
in the presentence investigation report regarding ability to pay
restitution because the5report
does not take objections or the arguments
8
of parties into account.
Whether sentence enhancements for more than minimal planning and
for an aggravating role in the offense can be applied together is an issue
of first impression in this circuit addressed in United States u. Stevenson.", The court noted that the vast majority of circuits have held that
applying these enhancements together is not double counting while one
circuit has held that it is impermissible.' The court sided with the

50.

69 F.3d 1553 (11th Cir. 1995).

51. Id. at 1557.
52. Id.
53.

69 F.3d 482 (11th Cir. 1995).

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 492 (restitution is addressed in U.S.S.G. § 5E1.1).
Id.
Id. at 493.
Id. (brackets in original).
Id. at 494.

59. 68 F.3d 1292, 1292 (11th Cir. 1995).
60. United States v. Massey, 48 F.3d 1560 (10th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Wilkins
v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 2628 (1995); United States v. Godfrey, 25 F.3d 263 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 429 (1994); United States v. Wong, 3 F.3d 667 (3d Cir. 1993); United
States v. Rappaport, 999 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Willis, 997 F.2d 407 (8th
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 704 (1994); United States v. Kelly, 993 F.2d 702 (9th Cir.
1993); United States v. Curtis, 934 F.2d 553 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v. Boula, 932
F.2d 651 (7th Cir. 1991), affd in part, vacated in part, 997 F.2d 263 (1993).
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majority, holding that because the two provisions "concern[] conceptually
separate notions relating to sentencing," the application of both is
permissible.6 1
B. Chapter One-Introductionand GeneralApplication Principles
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3: Relevant Conduct."' In United States u.
Reese,6 the court reversed drug sentences imposed under an incorrect
application of the rules of relevant conduct." The district court had
determined the drug quantity attributable to each defendant based on
the drugs he or she actually had a part in distributing and also on the
amount each defendant knew the organization as a whole distributed.
In other words, each defendant was held accountable for the entire
amount of drugs sold by the organization.'
The Eleventh Circuit,
reviewing the recently amended language of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, held that
a defendant may only be sentenced based on the drugs the defendant
actually participated in selling and "other conduct that was reasonably
foreseeable alzd within the scope of the criminal activity that the
defendant agreed to undertake."' Knowledge is no longer enough.
C. ChapterTwo-Specific Offenses
1. U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1:
Threatening Communications. This
guideline calls for a six-level enhancement "[i]f the offense involved any
conduct evidencing an intent to carry out [the] threat." 7 In United
States u. Barbour," the defendant travelled to Washington, D.C. hoping
to kill the president and then himself. He was thwarted because the
president was in Russia.69 Later, he told a neighbor of his plan.7"
The defendant objected to the enhancement because the conduct upon

61. 68 F.3d at 1294.
62. Although the determination of drug quantities is largely dependent on the rules of
relevant conduct detailed in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, most of those cases are more appropriately
discussed in relation to the drug guideline, U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, later in this article.
63. 67 F.3d 902, 902 (11th Cir. 1995).
64. Id. at 909.
65. Id. at 904-05.
66. Id. at 907 (emphasis in original).
67. U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1(b)(1).
68. 70 F.3d 580 (11th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1445 (1996).
69. 70 F.3d at 583.
70. Id.
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which it was based occurred before he communicated his threat to
anyone.71 The Eleventh Circuit, following other circuits,72 held that:
under certain circumstances pre-threat conduct may be used as
evidence to demonstrate a defendant's intent to carry out a threat.
Factors a district court should consider in determining the probative
value of pre-threat conduct include the following: the proximity in time
between the threat and the prior conduct, the seriousness of defendant's prior conduct, and the extent to which the pre-threat conduct
has progressed towards carrying out the threat.73
2. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1: Dugs--Marijuana. According to United
States v. Smith,74 the district court should approximate the usable76
weight of damp marijuana.75 The court withdrew an earlier opinion
agreeing with the Seventh 77 and Tenth Circuits.7' The court relied on
a guideline amendment proposed by the Sentencing Commission which
calls for an approximation of the usable amount of marijuana which is
"too wet to be consumed without drying."79
The court refined the definition of marijuana in United States v.
Foree,0 holding for the first time that for marijuana cuttings to be
plants within the meaning of the statute 1 and the sentencing guidelines, 2 there must be roots.8 3 This holding is consistent with every
other circuit that has entertained the question. 4 Despite arguments
by the government suggesting that scientific testing could more precisely

71. Id. at 586.
72. Id. at 586-87 (citing United States v. Hines, 26 F.3d 1469 (9th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Gary, 18F.3d 1123 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 134 (1994)).
73. Id. at 587.
74. 51 F.3d 980 (11th Cir. 1995).
75. Id. at 982.
76. Id. at 981.
77. Id. (citing United States v. Garcia, 925 F.2d 170, 172-73 (7th Cir. 1991)).
78. Id. (citing United States v. Pinedo-Montoya, 966 F.2d 591, 595-96 (10th Cir. 1992)).
79. Id. (citing Proposed Amendments to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 56 CRIM.
L. REP. [BNA] 2063, 2088, 2090 (Jan. 11, 1995)). This became Amendment 518 to the
United States Sentencing Guidelines, effective. November 1, 1995.
80. 43 F.3d 1572 (11th Cir. 1995).
81. Id. at 1574 (construing 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)).
82. Id. (construing U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)).
83. Id.
84. See United States v. Burke, 999 F.2d 596 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v. Edge, 989
F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1993); United States v. Delaporte, No. 94-1407 (7th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Curtis, 965 F.2d 610 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Bechtol, 939 F.2d 603 (8th
Cir. 1991); United States v. Carlisle, 907 F.2d 94 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Robinson, 35 F.3d 442 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1268 (1995); United States
v. Eves, 932 F.2d 856 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 884 (1991).
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define the term, the court held that "if it looks like a 'plant'. . . it [is) a
plant"" and found that marijuana must display "some readily observable evidence of root formation" to be called a 'plant.'8 This holding is
significant because, although the guidelines call for the base offense level
to be determined by the weight of marijuana, if there are fifty or more
plants, each plant is presumed to weigh one hundred grams regardless
of its actual weight."
By the same token, "dead, harvested root systems are not 'plants'
within the meaning of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) and the 'equivalency provision'
of U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)," according to United States v. Shields." When
police searched the house in which the defendant was living, they found
a number of live marijuana plants and a trash can full of dead,
crumbling roots left over from previously-harvested plants. 9 Relying
on the decision in Foree, the court found that, "Foree... treats evidence
of life as a necessary (but alone insufficient) prerequisite of 'planthood,'
and its reasoning counsels rejection of the government's converse
contention here that dead marijuana remains are plants simply because
they have roots.' °
3. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1: Drugs-Methamphetamine. Methamphetamine exists in two chemically and physiologically distinct forms:
D-Methamphetamine and L-Methamphetamine. 91 There is a corresponding difference in the way each is sentenced 2 The Eleventh
Circuit has held that, because the nature of the substance invokes such
a great sentence difference, the government must present evidence as to
In United States v. Ramsdale,94 no
the type of methamphetamine.
evidence was presented to support the government's burden, but the
defendant failed to preserve an objection. The Eleventh Circuit held,

85. 43 F.3d at 1581.
86. Id. at 1580 (quoting United States v. Edge, 989 F.2d 871, 876-79 (6th Cir. 1993)).
87. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) (background commentary). The equivalency has been amended
to eliminate this problem. See U.S.S.G. amend. 518 (Nov. 1, 1995).
88. 49 F.3d 707, 708 (11th Cir.), vacated, 63 F.3d 900 (1995). This opinion has been
vacated pending en banc review, but its logic is persuasive. 63 F.3d 900 (11th Cir. 1995).
89. 49 F.3d at 708.
90. Id. at 710 (parenthesis in original).
91. See United States v. Carroll, 6 F.3d 735, 745 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 1234 (1994).
92. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, but see Amendment 518, effective November 1, 1995.
93. United States v. Patrick, 983 F.2d 206, 208 (11th Cir. 1993).
94. 61 F.3d 825, 831 (11th Cir. 1995).
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noting a split in the circuits, 95 that the distinction is so significant as

to warrant review or suffer a "grave miscarriage of justice."'
of
4. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1: Drugs--LSD. Issues regarding the weight 97
LSD continue to flourish in the wake of Chapman v. United States,
which held that the combined weight of LSD and its carrier medium
should be used to determine the applicability of any minimum mandatory sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). 98 After the decision in
Chapman, the sentencing commission amended the guideline to provide
a fixed weight per dose of LSD in an attempt to focus the sentence on
the amount of actual LSD rather than the weight of the carrier
medium." Since the amendment, nearly all the circuits have decided
whether the guidelines override the statutory mandatory minimum
sentence. Most have held that they do not and that the Chapman
directive to weigh everything drives the mandatory minimum.'0° Only
two circuits have held that the guidelines take precedence.' 0 ' The
Eleventh Circuit sided with the majority of circuits in United States v.
Pope."° Now, if the entire weight of the seized contraband invokes a
statutory mandatory sentence higher than that called for by the
guidelines based on the specified weight-per-dose formula, the statutory
minimum mandatory sentence applies. 3 The court acknowledged that
this holding is difficult to reconcile with recent Eleventh Circuit

95. Id. (citing United States v. Deninno, 29 F.3d 572 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 117 (1995) (holding that the issue is not cognizable on appeal); United States v.
Bogusz, 43 F.3d 82 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1812 (1995) (holding the
opposite)).
96. Id. at 832 (quoting Bogusz, 43 F.3d at 90).
97. 500 U.S. 453 (1991).
98. Id. at 468. LSD is a liquid and is usually painted on a paper "carrier" such as
blotter paper or sheets of stamps. It is then marked and cut into small pieces containing
a single does of the drug. The weight of the carrier varies dramatically from case to case
even though the actual amount of drug may be the same.
99. See U.S.S.G. amend. 488 (Nov. 1, 1995) (commentary).
100. United States v. Andress, 47 F.3d 839, 840 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Hanlin, 48 F.3d 121, 123 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v. Neal, 46 F.3d 1405 (7th Cir.) (en
banc), affd, 116 S. Ct. 763 (1996); United States v. Pardue, 36 F.3d 429 (5th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1969 (1995); United States v. Mueller, 27 F.3d 494 (10th Cir. 1994);
United States v. Boot, 25 F.3d 52 (1st Cir. 1994).
101. United States v. Mischik, 49 F.3d 512, 514 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Stoneking, 34 F.3d 651, 652, vacated and rehg granted en banc, 60 F.3d 399 (8th Cir.
1995).
102. 58 F.3d 1567, 1570 (11th Cir. 1995).
103. Id. at 1572; see also U.S.S.G. § 5Gl.1(b).
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decisions such as United States v. Munoz-Realpe,' and the issue may
soon be decided by the Supreme Court."°
Drugs-Determining Drug Quanti5.
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1:
ties. Determining the quantity of drugs applicable to various defendants in drug conspiracies under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 is an issue that the
court is constantly required to resolve. This year was no exception.
In United States v. Lawrence,"° the district court, following the
advice of the probation office and the Assistant United States Attorney,
engaged in a complicated and attenuated mathematical effort to
determine the appropriate drug quantity to apply to each defendant. By
relying on a few days of videotaped surveillance the court determined
the average number of drug sales each day; by weighing the drugs seized
in a small number of controlled buys the court selected an average
weight per transaction; and, using the date that a particular defendant
first appeared on videotape (and assuming that each was involved until
the last date charged in the conspiracy), the court determined the
number of days that each defendant was involved in the conspiracy.
Then, by multiplying the average number of transactions per day by the
average weight sold in each transaction and again by the number of
days, the district court arrived at the overall quantity attributed to the
defendant. 7 The Eleventh Circuit found insufficient facts to support
The governthe findings made by the district court and remanded.'
ment presented little or no real evidence, and the district court never
studied the surveillance tapes."' In the end, there was no indication
that the bizarre calculation yielded a reliable determination of drug
quantities.
The court noted that "[allthough not as rigorous as the reasonable
doubt or clear and convincing standards, the preponderance standard is
not toothless. It is the district court's duty to ensure that the Government carries the burden by presenting reliable and specific evidence."1 The court added:
Moreover, while the Guidelines allow a district court to "consider
relevant information without regard to its admissibility under the rules

104. Pope, 58 F.3d at 1570 (citing United States v. Munoz-Realpe, 21 F.3d 375 (11th
Cir. 1994)).
105. United States v. Neal, 115 S. Ct. 2576 (1995).
106. 47 F.3d 1559 (11th Cir. 1995).
107. Id. at 1562-63.
108. Id. at 1561.
109. Id. at 1564-66.
110. Id. at 1566.
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of evidence applicable at trial, provided that the information has
sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy,"
U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a) (Nov. 1, 1994), this relaxed evidentiary standard
does not grant district courts a license to sentence a defendant in the
absence of sufficient evidence when the defendant properly objects to
a PSR's conclusory factual recitals .... The necessity of requiring
reliable evidence in support of the Government's conclusions is
particularly manifest in cases such as this, where the quantity of drugs
attributed to the defendant can have a marked impact on the length of
his sentence."'
The court next reviewed whether the district court had clearly erred
in adopting the government's calculations. However, the probation
reports "fail[edl to reveal the sources of much of the information they
contain[ed] and set forth several conclusions without providing the
underlying facts."'12 The government's "proffers consisted of perfunctory summaries" and videotapes which were evidence at the trials of other
defendants."' The court's disapproval of the sentencing process in this
case is evident:
The district court heard no testimony on the quantity issue, did not
require that any surveillance videotapes be entered into evidence at the
hearings, and did not examine any physical evidence. As a result,
there is no evidence from the sentencing hearings for us to review.
Moreover,
no trial evidence exists because none of the appellants went
114
to trial.

The court also remanded the case of United States v. Lee" 5 because
of insufficient factual findings regarding drug quantities in the court
below.
6. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1: Drugs-Guns and Drugs. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) requires a two-level enhancement "[ilf a dangerous weapon

(including a firearm) was possessed ... r.""' The commentary which
explains the enhancement suggests that "the adjustment should be
applied if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly improbable that
the weapon was connected with the offense."" 7 The Eleventh Circuit
holds that, once the government has established the presence of a gun

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 1567.
Id.
Id. at 1568.
Id.
68 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 1995).
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1).
Id. § 2D1.1, cmt. 3.
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at the site of drug offenses, the burden to prove that it was not
possessed in connection with the crime shifts to the defendant."" In
so holding, the court sided with a clear majority of circuits."' In Hall
the government presented only the fact that a gun was found in a
dresser drawer near the usual implements of the drug trade."20 The
court held that, "[olnce the prosecution has shown by a preponderance
of the evidence that the firearm was present at the site of the charged
conduct, the evidentiary burden shifts to the defendant to show that a
between the firearm and the offense is clearly improbaconnection
21
ble."

1

Later, in United States v. Hansley,'2 the court followed Hall, finding
that the enhancement applied where a firearm was found in the
Hansley
defendant's house along with cash and drug ledgers. 2
objected to the enhancement but did not prove that the connection
24
between the drug activity and the gun was clearly improbable.1
This enhancement is likely to be applied with more and more
frequency because of the recent Supreme Court opinion in Bailey v.
United States. 25 Bailey severely restricts the circumstances under
which a conviction for using or carrying a firearm during and in relation
to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime will stand2 6 by
defining the word "use" much more restrictively than most circuits have
previously. 27 A conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) requires a fiveyear mandatory sentence consecutive to any sentence received for the
underlying offense."2 The sentencing guidelines acknowledge that,
where this mandatory sentence is applied, the two-level adjustment in
section 2D1.1(b)(1) does not apply.'2 Now, after Bailey, the number
of convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) connected to drug convictions

118,

United States v. Hall, 46 F.3d 62, 63 (11th Cir. 1995).

119. See United States v. Cochran, 14 F.3d 1128, 1132 (6th Cir. 1994); United States
v. Cantero, 995 F.2d 1407 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Corcimiglia, 967 F.2d 724, 728
(1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Roberts, 980 F.2d 645, 647 (10th Cir. 1992); United States
v. Restrepo, 884 F.2d 1294, 1296 (9th Cir. 1989). ContraUnited States v. Khang, 904 F.2d
1219, 1229 (8th Cir. 1990).
120, Hall, 46 F.3d at 63. A search uncovered a large amount of cash in the drawer,
scales, cocaine residue, and more cash in the same room. Id.
121, Id.
122. 54 F.3d 709 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 575 (1995).
123. 54 F.3d at 716.
124, Id.
125. 116 S. Ct. 501 (1995).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129, U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4, cmt. 2.

868

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

should drop dramatically. An increase in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1)
applications should parallel that decline.
7. U.S.S.G. § 2G2.4: Possession of Materials Depicting a Minor
Engaged in Sexually Explicit Conduct. In United States v.
Cole, 3 ' the defendant was convicted of receiving a videotape depicting
a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct.1" 1 A guideline enhancement applies when the child depicted is "prepubescent" or "under the age
of twelve years." 32 Cole possessed a catalog offering tapes of children
of various ages. 33 Although he ordered a video tape of twelve- to
fourteen-year-olds and sent enough money for only one tape, he included
a note saying he wanted all the tapes available.' 34 The tape he was
sent depicted a child under the age of twelve.'3 The district court
enhanced the sentence based on Cole's statement of future intent to
purchase more tapes, but the Eleventh Circuit held that the enhancement was improperly applied. 3 6
8. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1: Firearms Offenses. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5)
provides an upward adjustment in the sentencing guidelines if "the
defendant used or possessed any firearm ... in connection with another
felony offense." The defendant in United States v. Whitfield'37 burglarized a residence, confronted a witness with a gun, and then committed
another burglary." While in the second home, he was discovered by
police in a posture they interpreted as a planned ambush. 39 Whitfield
claimed that the gun was part of the property he had taken from the
burglaries and that he had not used or possessed it "in connection with"
the burglaries. 40 The Eleventh Circuit interpreted the phrase for the
first time, relying on the law of other circuits."" The court debated
various standards for determining the nexus required between the gun

130.
131.

61 F.3d 24 (11th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1052 (1996).
61 F.3d at 24 (in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2)).

132. U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(1).
133. Id.
134.
135.

61 F.3d at 25.
Id.

136. Id.
137.

50 F.3d 947 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 234 (1995).

138. 50 F.3d at 947-48.
139. Id. at 948.
140. Id.
141. Id. (citing United States v. Routon, 25 F.3d 815, 819 (9th Cir. 1994); United States
v. Gomez-Arrellano, 5 F.3d 464 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Brewster, 1 F.3d 51, 54
(1st Cir. 1993); United States v. Thompson, 32 F.3d 1, 6-7 (1st Cir. 1994)).
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and the underlying felony, but found that Whitfield's142conduct, by any
standard, was sufficient to uphold the enhancement.
D. Chapter Three-Adjustments
1. U.S.S.G. § 1B.l(f): More Than Minimal Planning. In United
States v. Tapia,'" the defendants attacked a cellmate who was preparing to testify against the defendants' friend and used the phone in their
cell to confirm the victim's role against the friend.1" The district court
4
assessed a two-level increase based on more than minimal planning.1
The Eleventh Circuit remanded, finding that the crime was neither
sophisticated nor elaborate and that the phone calls made just before the
crime were not evidence of more than the usual planning for such a
crime.'"6

2. U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1: Vulnerable Victim. Several cases this year
focused on the enhancement for vulnerable victims found in U.S.S.G.
§ 3A1.1. A two-level upward adjustment may be warranted "[if the
defendant knew or should have known that a victim of the offense was
unusually vulnerable due to age, physical or mental condition, or that
a victim was otherwise particularly susceptible to the criminal conduct." 47 Examples are included in the guideline.
The court held that the enhancement applies to telemarketers who
targeted those with bad credit in United States v. Page4 ' and to
lenders who took advantage of a client's urgent need to leave the country
in United States v. Thomas.'49 Both cases involved advance loan fee
schemes, where the defendant pressured clients to advance a processing
fee, promising in return to secure financing, but making no real effort to
do so."
In Thomas, the defendants secured a power of attorney from an army
colonel before he left for duty in the Philippines.'' They knew that he
would be gone for several years and convinced him that the power of

142.

Id. at 948-49.

143. 59 F.3d 1137 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 546 (1995).
144.
145.

59 F.3d at 1139.
Id. at 1144.

146. Id.
147. U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b).
148. 69 F.3d 482, 491 (11th Cir. 1995).
149. 62 F.3d 1332, 1345 (11th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1058 (1996).
150. Page, 69 F.3d at 482, 485; Thomas, 62 F.3d at 1335-36.
151. Thomas, 62 F.3d at 1342.
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attorney was crucial to their quest for financing.1 2 He testified that
they had misused the power of attorney and that he had been forced to
borrow money at inflated interest rates in order to save his home from
foreclosure,'
The defendants argued that they had not targeted the
Colonel because of his vulnerability, rather his urgent need to leave the
country arose only after the defendants had secured him as a client.
Additionally, they argued he was a sophisticated investor who should
have known better.'4 The court found that:
The Thomases exploited the fact that [the Colonel] was vulnerable by
using the power of attorney they had earlier obtained to garner two
loans without his knowledge. These acts were sufficient to constitute
the "targeting"-or "retargeting," as it may have been-of [the Colonel]
as a victim in order to take advantage of his vulnerability, his absence.
By the same token, the acts demonstrate that the Thomases actually
knew that [the Colonel's] absence from the country made him
vulnerable to their fraud, or to a continuation of it.'
Explaining the breadth of this holding, the court quickly noted that,
"[w]e hold only that in cases where the 'thrust of the wrongdoing' was
continuing in nature, the defendants' attempt to exploit the victim's
vulnerability will result in an enhancement even if that vulnerability did
not exist at the time the defendant initially targeted the victim.""
The telemarketers in Page placed nationwide print ads offering loans
to poor credit risks. When the victims phoned in, high pressure sales
tactics focused on how difficult it was for the victim to find financing
through conventional banks." 7 The defendants may not have known
in the beginning of their victims' vulnerability, but they soon learned of
it and took advantage of it.'8 The fact that some victims with good
credit and no particular vulnerability were also taken in by the scam did
"not absolve the defendants of their culpability.., simply because, in
casting out their net, they happened to ensnare and defraud some
individuals who did not share this vulnerability."'59
An incarcerated informant, attacked by the defendants because of his
cooperation, was properly considered a vulnerable victim according to

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id.at 1344.
Id. at 1342.
Id. at 1344.
Id. at 1345.
Id.
Page, 69 F.3d at 489-90.
Id at 490.
Id. at 491-92.
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United States v. Tapia.'60 The court reasoned that the victim's
incarceration made it impossible6 for him to escape and was the reason
he was targeted for the attack.1 '
3. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3: Abuse of Trust. The defendant in United
States v. Terry 2 was a police officer who, while in uniform and in his
marked patrol car and monitoring police radio transmissions, drove by
a park where a codefendant was conducting a drug transaction. The
district court found that the protection, security, and surveillance that
Terry's presence provided "significantly facilitated" the commission or
concealment of the crime." The Eleventh Circuit agreed.'
4. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1: Acceptance of Responsibility. In United
States v. Hromada," the defendant was arrested in late 1991 on
marijuana charges.'" Within weeks of his release he tested positive
twice for drug use, but never again during the next two years of
release.'6 7 The district court denied a reduction for acceptance of
responsibility because of Hromada's drug use. The Eleventh Circuit
upheld the decision, giving "great deference to" the district court's
evaluation and finding that the district court had the better opportunity
to evaluate the defendant's acceptance of responsibility."6
Not surprisingly, the court also agreed that a defendant who burdened
the government with prosecuting a motion to suppress which would
have, if successful, ended the prosecution and who then refused to plead
guilty, was not entitled to a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. 6' The defendant offered to enter a conditional plea of guilty after
he lost the motion, but the government refused. 7 ' The Eleventh
Circuit found that the defendant's challenge to the evidence was an
attempt "to avoid a determination of factual guilt and to thereby escape
responsibility for his crime." 71

160. 59 F.3d 1137, 1143 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 546 (1995).

161. Id.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

60 F.3d 1541 (lth Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 737 (1996).
60 F.3d at 1545.
Id.
49 F.3d 685 (11th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 688.
Id. at 691.
Id. (citing United States v. De La Rosa, 922 F.2d 675, 680 (11th Cir. 1991)).
United States v. Gonzalez, 70 F.3d 1236, 1240 (11th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1238.
Id. at 1239.
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Chapter Four--CriminalHistory

1. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2: Departures Based on Criminal Histo.
ry. Although the rules of Chapter Four prohibit the use of convictions
which are remote in time from the offense of conviction, U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3
permits a departure based on those convictions when they are either
similar to the offense of conviction or otherwise serious. 172 In determining the extent of such a departure, the district court is instructed to
begin with the criminal history category called for by application of the
Chapter Four rules and then to score the remote convictions as though
they were not precluded by the rules.'
The defendant in Brown had been convicted of escape but three prior
fraud convictions were too old to count.174 The district court found
them to be "serious" nonetheless, and departed from category IV to
category VI. 175

The defendant complained that the court failed to

consider the intervening criminal history category as a reasonable
incremental measure of the under-representation of his criminal conduct,
but the district court's explanation in reaching category VI demonstrated
that the court had not simply overlooked the intervening category. 176
In United States v. Maurice,"' the defendant had, over a period of
more than a year, held himself out as an attorney practicing immigration law when he was not actually an attorney.7 " He was convicted
of mail fraud and of making false statements.'7 9 Maurice had nine
prior convictions too remote to score under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(e)(2) which
would, if counted, have added seventeen criminal history points.' s°
The district court followed the formula recently added to the guidelines:
add criminal history points to reach category VI (the highest criminal
history category) and then add offense levels to reach a reasonable
departure range.'"' The result was a departure from category II to

172. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3.
173. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 (policy statement); see also United States v. Brown, 51 F.3d 233,
234 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. Maurice, 69 F,3d 1553, 1558 (11th Cir. 1995).
174. Brown, 51 F.3d at 234.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. 69 F.3d 1553, 1555 (11th Cir. 1995).
178. Id. at 1555.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1555-56.

181. Id. at 1558 (construing U.S.S.G. amend. 460 (Nov. 1, 1992)).
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category VI and a higher offense level, which the Eleventh Circuit
upheld."8 2
Near the end of the year, the Eleventh Circuit refined the procedure
district courts must follow when making upward departures beyond
category VI. In United States v. Dixon," the defendant argued that
before arriving at an appropriate departure, the district court must stop
at each offense level along the upward path and find that it was not
appropriate before moving on to the next higher level.' The Eleventh
Circuit disagreed, holding that district courts:
need not explicitly discuss their reasons for bypassing incremental
offense level sentencing ranges. Rather, the magnitude of these
upward departures will be reviewed for reasonableness, based on
findings by the district court as to (1)why the extent and nature of the
defendant's criminal history warrants an upward departure from
category VI, and (2) why the sentencing range within which the
defendant is sentenced is appropriate to the case. 1"
2. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1: Career Offender. The Career Offender
provision of the sentencing guidelines violates neither the due process
nor the equal protection clauses of the Fifth Amendment, according to
United States v. Brant.'
Two cases presented related questions: whether conspiracy to commit
a drug trafficking offense is a "controlled substance offense" and whether
the attempt to commit a drug trafficking crime is a "controlled substance
offense" as those terms are used to determine when prior convictions can
be used to invoke the career criminal provisions of the guidelines. In
United States v. Weir, 5 7 the court sided with the vast majority of
circuits that conspiracy convictions could appropriately be used as a

182.
183,
184.
185.

Id.
71 F.3d 380 (11th Cir. 1995).
Id, at 381.
Id. at 383.

186. 62 F.3d 367, 368 (11th Cir. 1995).
187. 51 F.3d 1031, 1031 (11th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 928 (1996); see also
U.S.S.G. amend. 528 (Nov. 1, 1995).
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basis for the enhancement.'88 The court noted a small minority
holding to the contrary, 9
Soon after the opinion in Weir, the court decided United States v.
Smith,"9 holding for the same reasons that the crime of attempted
drug trafficking is also an appropriate enhancing conviction.19
In United States v. Spell,'" the defendant was enhanced as a career
offender based on a Florida conviction of burglary for which he received
a four-year sentence.'
The district court relied on the charging
document to determine that the defendant had been convicted of a crime
of violence.' " In Florida, all burglaries which are second degree
felonies punishable by up to fifteen years are crimes of violence, but
those which are third degree felonies punishable by five years are not
crimes of violence because they involve only unoccupied structures. 9 "
Because he had only been sentenced to four years, it was possible that
the defendant pled to a third degree (and therefore non-violent) burglary,
but the district court did not consider this possibility.'" The court
held that "a district court may not rely on a charging document without
first establishing that the crime charged was the same crime for which
the defendant was convicted." 97 The case was remanded for further
findings. 98
This circuit had not squarely decided "whether a sentence of probation
under a state deferral statute is a final 'prior conviction' for purposes
of the sentence enhancement provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 841" until United

188. 51 F.3d at 1031-32; see also United States v. Piper, 35 F.3d 611, 616-17 (1st Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1118 (1995); United States v. Hightower, 25 F.3d 182, 186-87
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 370 (1994); United States v. Kennedy, 32 F.3d 876, 888
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 939 (1994); United States v. Damerville, 27 F.3d 254,25657 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 445 (1994); United States v. Baker, 16 F.3d 854, 857
(8th Cir. 1994); Dyer v. United States, 23 F.3d 1421, 1424 n.2 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 907 (1990); United States v. Heim, 15 F.3d 830, 831-32 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 55 (1994); United States v. Allen, 24 F.3d 1180, 1186 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 493 (1994).
189. Weir, 51 F.3d at 1032 (citing United States v. Price, 990 F.2d 1267 (D.C. Cir.
1993); United States v. Bellazerius, 24 F.3d 698 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 375
(1994)).
190. 54 F.3d 690 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 329 (1995).
191. 54 F.3d at 693.
192. 44 F.3d 936 (11th Cir. 1995).
193. Id. at 940.
194. Id. at 938.
195. Id. at 939-40.
196. Id. at 940.
197. Id.
198. Id.
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States v. Fernandez.'" The statute imposes a minimum mandatory
sentence for defendants who have previously been convicted of a felony
drug offense.2" Fernandez had earlier pled no contest, adjudication
was withheld, and he was given a one-year probationary sentence. 0 1
The court relied on earlier cases which held that similar sentences were
prior convictions for purposes of invoking the career offender provision
of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 and held that the sentence was also a conviction for
purposes of the statutory enhancement.0 2
3. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4: Armed Career Criminal. Last year, the
Supreme Court held in Custis v. United States,0 3 that prior convictions
used to enhance a sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) cannot be
attacked collaterally unless they were obtained in violation of the
defendant's right to counsel. 20 4 The Eleventh Circuit adopted that
ruling in United States v. Gilley. °5
F

ChapterFive: Departures
In United States v. Williams,0 6 the defendant Was convicted of
carjacking. 2 7 Two victims, Donaldson and Whitehead, were driving
their truck when they realized they were being followed. In response,
Donaldson loaded a pistol. When the truck stopped at an intersection,
the defendant, who had been following the two, got out of his car and
approached the truck. When the defendant pointed a gun inside the
truck, Donaldson (the passenger) shot across Whitehead, hitting the
defendant. Unfortunately, one of the shots also killed Whitehead.2'
The district court departed from the sentencing guidelines pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 5K2.1 which permits a departure "if death resulted."
Williams claimed that Whitehead's death was an unforeseeable
consequence and an accident; the Court held that the departure was
appropriate because "death was intentionally or knowingly risked."2 9

199. 58 F.3d 593, 599 (11th Cir. 1995).
200. Id.
201. Id.

202. Id. (citing United States v. Jones, 910 F.2d 760 (11th Cir. 1990); United States
v. Garcia, 727 F.2d 1028 (11th Cir. 1984)).

203. 114 S. Ct. 1732 (1994).
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id. at 1739.
43 F.3d 1440, 1441 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2288 (1995).
51 F.3d 1004 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 258 (1995).
51 F.3d at 1006. See 18 U.S.C. § 2119.
51 F.3d at 1006.
Id. at 1012 (quoting United States v. White, 979 F.2d 539 (7th Cir. 1992)).
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Ivan Leon Rojas21 was convicted for possession of an unregistered
firearm.21' The sentencing court granted a downward departure
because it was convinced that Rojas possessed explosives, automatic
rifles, grenade launchers and machine guns in order to smuggle them to
the Cuban resistance movement.212 The departure was based on
U.S.S.G. § 5K2.11, which states:
Sometimes, a defendant may commit a crime in order to avoid a
perceived greater harm. In such instances, a reduced sentence may be
appropriate, provided that the circumstances significantly diminish
society's interest in punishing the conduct, for example, in the case of
a mercy killing. Where the interest in punishment or deterrence is not
reduced, a reduction in sentence is not warranted. For example,
providing defense secrets to a hostile power should receive no lesser
punishment simply because the defendant believed that the government's policies were misdirected. In other instances, conduct may not
cause or threaten the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law
proscribing the offense at issue. For example, where a war veteran
possessed a machine gun or grenade as a trophy, or a school teacher
possessed controlled substances for display in a drug education
program, a reduced sentence might be warranted.21
Rojas first claimed that the harm the statute sought to prevent, the
loss of life in the United States, was not the harm created by his crime
because he did not intend the guns to be used on American soil.214 The
government argued, and the Eleventh Circuit agreed, that the legislative
history of the statute contradicts this claim.215 Citing cases in other
circuits, the court held that the exceptions created by the departure are
extremely limited and fairly well defined.1 ' They include gun collections, the protection of property, hunting and sport shooting.217 Rojas
also argued that his actions sought to "avoid a greater harm" by
assisting the anti-Castro movement.21 The majority held that neither
reason was a valid basis for a departure and remanded for resenten-

210. United States v. Rojas, 47 F.3d 1078 (11th Cir. 1995).
211. Id. at 1079.

212. Id. at 1080.
213. U.S.S.G. § 512.11.
214. 47 F.3d at 1079.

215. Id. at 1081,
216. Id. at 1082.
217. Id. at 1081, See United States v. White Buffalo, 10 F.3d 575 (8th Cir. 1993);
United States v. Lam, 20 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Warner, 43 F.3d 1335
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1090 (1994).
218. Rojas, 47 F.3d at 1082.
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cing."' Judge Fay wrote a compelling dissent arguing that America's
constantly changing diplomatic policy toward Cuba presents a situation
so unusual that the sentencing court should have discretion to consider
it as a factor in fashioning a departure."0
In United States u. Thomas,22 discussed earlier in this article, the
district court imposed a two-level upward departure pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 5K2.5 to account for the consequential damages of an advance
fee fraud scheme. 2" Using the formula set out in earlier circuit
precedent,2 ' the court found that the departure was unwarranted.2 24
The court found that the Commission had intentionally excluded
consequential damages from loss calculations in all but government
procurement and product substitution cases, so a departure could
only be supported if the damages were so great that they were "present
to a degree substantially in excess of that which ordinarily is involved
in the offense."2 s In this case, the damages, which included accountant and attorney fees, travel expenses and the like, were "clearly typical
of a crime of fraud" and could not support a departure.2 7
In United States v. Rodriguez,225 the defendant's guideline range was
higher than the statutory maximum for his offense of conviction, even
after adjustment for acceptance of responsibility.229 Although the
district court wanted to reward Rodriguez for his acceptance, it believed
it had no authority to do so under U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(a). 230 That
guideline holds that where the statutory maximum is less than the
guideline range, the sentence should be the statutory maximum.23 '
The statutory maximum for Rodriguez's two convictions were four years
each (or 96 months)2 312 and the guidelines after the U.S.S.G. § 3E.1(b)
Rodriguez
adjustment called for a range of 135 to 168 months.2
argued that this result nullified his acceptance of responsibility and that

219.
220.
221.
7803).
222.
223.
224.

Id.
Id. at 1082-83.
62 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Feb. 2, 1996) (No. 95Id. at 1345.
Id. at 1346 (citing United States v. Wilson, 993 F.2d 214 (11th Cir. 1993)).
Id.

225. Id.
U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0.
227. 62 F.3d at 1347.
228. 64 F.3d 638 (11th Cir. 1995).
226.

229. Id. at 640.
230. Id. at 641 n.3.

231. Id. (construing U.S.S.G. § 561.1(a)).
232. Id. at 640.
233. Id.
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the district court could have departed under the circumstances.' The
Eleventh Circuit held "that a district court has the discretion to reward
a defendant's acceptance of responsibility by departing downward when
section 5G1.1(a) renders section 3E1.1 ineffectual in reducing the
defendant's actual sentence."5 Naturally, the court did not suggest
that the departure should be granted, only that the district court had
the authority to grant it.' The court noted, however, that the district
court seemed inclined to grant the departure on remand." 7
V. CONCLUSION

If the Eleventh Circuit had an easier 1995 because of the few
guideline amendments in 1994, it was a short-lived vacation. The 1995
amendments are many and complex; and not easily interpreted.
Likewise, the Supreme Court has opened Pandora's Box with its
decision in Bailey.'
This is undoubtedly the most controversial
decision rendered in a criminal case in some time and the flood of
appeals filed in its wake has already begun.
The Eleventh Circuit will continue to hold the district courts to their
obligation to base sentencings on competent and reliable evidence clearly
apparent on the record, in order to reduce both the uncertainty of
sentencing and the burden of successive appeals.
In the years since the sentencing guidelines took effect, the tremendous body of appellate law is finally becoming more stable. There are
fewer circuit splits (largely because the Sentencing Commission often
addresses them with guideline amendments), and fewer controversial
decisions than in the past. *If the goal of guideline sentencing is
uniformity and predictability, then perhaps the goal is finally in sight.

234. Id. at 642.
235. Id. at 643 (agreeing with United States v. Cook, 938 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Sayers, 919 F.2d 1321 (Sth Cir. 1990); United States v. Martin, 893 F.2d
73 (5th Cir. 1990)).
236. I& at 643.
237. Id. at 641 n.3.
238. 64 U.S.L.W. 4039 (1995).

